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Abstract In order to analyze the determinants of tax evasion, the existing literature
on individual tax compliance typically takes a prior-to-audit point of view. This
paper focuses on a post-audit, post-detection  so far unexplored  framework,
by investigating what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant
taxpayers are asked to pay their debts. We rst develop a two-period dynamic model of
individual choice, considering an individual that has been already audited and detected
as tax evader, who knows that Tax Authorities are looking for her to cash the due
amount. We derive the optimal decision of running away in order to avoid paying
the bill, and show that the experience of a prior tax notice reduces the probability
to behave as a sco­ aw. We then exploit information on post-audit, post-detection
tax compliance provided by an Italian collection agency for the period 2004-2007 to
empirically assess the relationship between prior tax notices and unlawful behavior. The
evidence from alternative logit model specications supports our theoretical prediction:
successful tax notices are negatively correlated with the probability of running away.
Keywords Tax evasion, Tax collection, Post-audit tax enforcement, Tax notice
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is one of the most important problems that Tax Administrations need to
tackle all around the world, but o¢ cial statistics on tax frauds are di¢ cult to obtain
since tax evasion is typically unobserved. Estimates of the shadow economy provided,
e.g., by Schneider and Enste (2000) and Buehn and Schneider (2012) suggest that the
problem is huge in developing countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Thailand and Bolivia,
where the informal economy represents between 50% and 70% of GDP from early 1990s
through late 2000s. The problem is relevant also in OECD Mediterranean countries
(like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) and in Belgium, where the equivalent gure
over the same period amounts to 20-30% of GDP. The lowest estimates are referred
to Switzerland, Japan, the United States and Austria, where the shadow economy still
covers about 8-11% of GDP. Given the importance of the problem, it is not surprising
that in the economic literature a large number of papers has been produced on the topic
of tax evasion (see, e.g., the surveys in Cowell, 1990; Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod and
Yitzhaki; 2002). As for economic theory, the standard approach à la Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) typically takes a prior-to-auditpoint of view, showing the responsive-
ness of tax evasion to variations in the tax-enforcement parameters, using a one-period
expected utility model.1 This basic approach has been extended to investigate the dy-
namics of tax compliance, considering current compliance as a function of past reports
and audit experiences. But the ndings on the responsiveness of the decision to evade
taxes to past audit experiences do not lead to unambiguous conclusions. In fact, the
update of beliefs about a future audit can lead either to an increase or to a decrease in
compliance, depending on the degree of risk aversion (e.g., Snow and Warren, 2007).
Also the empirical works based on this theoretical literature provide mixed results on
the impact of tax-enforcement e¤orts on compliance. In particular, the ndings of the
few papers based on actual evasion data partially conict with the larger literature
based on laboratory experiments (e.g., Erard, 1992; Bergman and Nevarez, 2006).
However, what is missing in the current literature is what happens after tax cheat-
ers have been discovered: Are Tax Authorities really able to cash the due amounts?
Di¢ culties to obtain reliable data on this stage are even more than those encountered
for tax evasion. An almost unique source at the global level are the estimates of tax
arrears (i.e., all unpaid taxes, including those where a dispute is involved, for all years
recorded on taxpayersaccounts) provided by the OECD, that seem to hint to a neg-
ative answer for the question posed above: in 2004, unpaid taxes were 51.3 % of net
annual revenue collections in Portugal, 42.8% in Greece, 38.7% in Belgium (OECD,
2007)). Therefore, in these countries not only people do evade taxes to a large extent,
but they also do not seem to pay their debts once their frauds have been detected.
Besides OECD statistics, this inability to collect taxes surfaces from a variety of
sources, hard to nd, for di¤erent countries. A vivid example is the USA. According
to Burman (2003), in a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on the Budget, «the IRS assesses almost $30 billion of taxes that it will never collect.
This is not theoretical tax evasion. The $30 billion represents underpayments of tax
that the IRS has identied but cannot collect because its sta¤ is spread so thin. [. . . ]
1For an exhaustive and critical discussion of the main ndings derived within the basic framework
of tax compliance decisions, see the surveys by Cowell (2004) and Sandmo (2006).
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According to IRS estimates, 60 percent of identied tax debts are never collected.
These unclosed cases include: 75% of identied nonlers; 79% of taxpayers who use
known abusive devicesto avoid taxes; 78% of taxpayers identied through document
matching programs. It is possible that some of these people simply cannot a¤ord to
pay their tax debts, but more than half  56%  of noncompliant taxpayers with
incomes over $100,000 get o¤ scot-free. It is demoralizing to honest taxpayers, and
encouraging to tax sco­ aws, that your odds are better than even of avoiding your tax
bill, even if you are caught» .
In this paper, we move a rst step in trying to ll this gap in the literature by focus-
ing on what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant taxpayers
are asked to pay their debts. Our contribution is twofold. We rst develop a two-period
dynamic model to analyze the post-audit, post-detectionindividuals choice problem
on a specic action to be taken to avoid paying the tax bill, and study the impact of
a previous tax notice on individuals compliance decision. In particular, we consider
individuals who have already been detected by Tax Authorities as noncompliant and
who can then decide to runaway, by changing their addressin order to hide out and
escape the notication by collection agents, thus avoiding to pay their bill (i.e., to be-
have as sco­ aws). Looking at the data we obtained from an Italian collection agency,
this is what happens in the real world for a considerable number of tax evaders. We
then present an empirical analysis based on real data, which focuses on Italy, a country
where estimated tax evasion is high, Tax Code is complex, general reprobation among
citizens due to tax evasion is low (e.g., Cannari and DAlessio, 2007), and the collection
system is ine¢ cient. Not surprisingly, also the problem of cashing due (unpaid) taxes
is large. According to available estimates provided by the Italian Agency for Internal
Revenues (Agenzia delle Entrate), in 2007 only 1.57% of the total amount of taxpayers
rolls has been cashed by collection agencies. Moreover, taking for instance the 2000
Tax Year, only 8.73% of the outstanding debts have been cashed after eight years.
The situation was even worse in the past, and it recently improved in 2005, with the
institution of a state-owned corporation (Riscossione S.p.A.) in charge of the enforce-
ment of the collection procedure through taxpayersroll and tax notice. In line with
the prediction of our theoretical model, the empirical analysis shows a clear negative
correlation between a previous tax notice and the probability of running away in the
attempt to escape a subsequent tax notice.2
Since we consider the problem of cashing due tax debts once tax evasion has been
discovered, our paper is related also to the (scant) literature on tax collection and
more generally  on debt collection. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) discuss the op-
timal size of a tax collection agency, explicitly considering the administrative costs of
revenue collection. They also derive an optimal rule which denes the appropriate
amount of resources that should be devoted to increasing the probability that evasion
is detected. Toma and Toma (1992) study when governments should rely on private
prot-maximizing tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors, suggesting that the rel-
evant trade-o¤ is between the incentive to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level
2Unfortunately, as we make clear below, administrative data as those we use here do not allow us to
truly estimate the causal impact of a previous tax notice on the decision to run away. On the causality
issue and the credibility revolutionin the empirical literature on tax evasion, see, e.g., Slemrod and
Weber (2012).
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of the former and the ine¢ ciencies stemming from the incentive to shirk of the lat-
ter. Cos¸gel and Miceli (2009) compare the variety of contractual agreements between
governments and tax collectors observed throughout history, providing a classication
based on the form of payment. They distinguish share contracts, xed rent contracts,
and xed wage contracts, suggesting that the latter type is widespread in modern eco-
nomies because of strong bureaucracies and sophisticated markets, which imply high
costs of measuring tax bases and revenues, and low costs of measuring the collectors
e¤ort. In the present paper, we take the size of the private collection agency and the
contract with the government as given, and analyze the institutional procedures for
tax collection after tax evasion has been discovered, and how these procedures impact
on the decision to behave as a sco­ aw. Considering a broader view on debt collection,
Chulwoo and Youngmin (2012) study how di¤erent actions taken by creditors a¤ect
the loss given default. These include legal debt collection practices (like foreclosure,
provisional seizure, and injunction), internal devices designed by the lender to enhance
debt collection (like debt amortization and rescheduling), and legal actions taken by
the debtor as a means of credit recovery (like individual workout, individual rehabilit-
ation, and individual bankruptcy). They nd that foreclosure is the rst action to be
taken, and unsurprisingly  it increases the share of cashed debts for creditors. In
this paper, we consider a peculiar debt collection practice, namely the tax rolland
the tax notice, and study how this can help to reduce losses for governments in terms
of due tax debts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides essential
background information on the tax collection procedure in Italy, with a particular
emphasis on the collection of taxes by taxpayersroll. In Section 3 we propose a simple
and stylized model of individual choice to study how the taxpayers decision of changing
address in order to avoid paying the bill is a¤ected by the presence of a prior notice.
Section 4 presents the data and our empirical tests on the relationship between the
probability of moving and the experience of a tax notice. Section 5 concludes.
2 The collection of taxes by taxpayersroll
In this section we briey describe the institutional features characterizing the collection
of taxes by taxpayersroll and the tax notice procedure in Italy. With respect to self-
taxation, these represent extra-ordinaryways of tax payment, which occur after an
audit and a detection of fraud by Tax Authorities. According to the Italian Tax Code,
audit and detection of frauds must happen within ve to seven years from the scal year
which the episode of tax cheating is referred to. These time limits usually correspond
to the lag with which Tax Authorities e¤ectively audit (and then eventually notice)
taxpayers.
When  for some individuals  tax frauds have been discovered, Tax Authorities
issue a tax roll, i.e., a list of taxpayers and of their due amounts including fees, interests
and a collection agencys premium. The tax roll becomes a document of execution with
the sign of the legal ownership of the Tax Authority that issued the roll. Notice also
that the tax roll clearly includes all payments that are due to a Public Administration,
e.g. income taxes and local taxes as well as other revenue receipts, like royalty rents,
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licence fees and administrative sanctions.
All the tax rolls issued by Tax Authorities are periodically sent to collection agencies
in charge of collecting taxes in specic geographical areas on the basis of the taxpayers
residence. It is up to collection agencies to notice to each individual included in a tax
roll the amount of taxes that are due (in other words, to deliver the bill). According
to the Italian law, the notice must occur within a set time limit, that lies between one
and three years according to the type of audit. This further increases the time lag
between the initial decision to evade taxes and the time when Tax Authorities attempt
at cashing due taxes.
The notice plays a crucial role in the collection procedure, because only noticed tax
debts allow Tax Authorities to legally expropriate the taxpayers assets whenever the
taxpayer will not pay the due amount within the term of two months starting from
the day of the notice. The most important problem of collection agencies is that in
many cases the taxpayer is di¢ cult to nd or, in extreme cases, her address is unknown
(because she hides out). Using the jargon of collection agencies, we talk here of the
taxpayers changing address. According to practitioners (and actual data, as we show
in the empirical part of the paper), this is an important phenomenon: if the collection
agency is not able to discover where the taxpayer hides, then the notice will not take
place within the set time limit. Moreover, even if the law provides for the notice to
occur without nding the taxpayer, its e¤ectiveness is clearly awed. Hence, hiding
from Tax Authorities is a way to avoid scal obligations and to make ine¤ective the
provisions of the Tax Code.
On the other hand, an individual to whom a tax return form has been noticed has
two opportunities: she can pay or not the due amount to the collection agency within
two months. If she pays, then her obligation comes to an end. Otherwise, she can
appeal against the tax return form to the Tax Court, or she can simply decide not to
pay, behaving as a sco­ aw. If she decides not to pay, then the collection agency starts
the enforcement within a year from the day of the notice, by expropriating taxpayer
assets (if she clearly has some). In both cases, by receiving a notice the individual
becomes aware of the enforcement e¤orts by Tax Authorities. The notice can then
be interpreted as a signal of these enforcement e¤orts, which is likely to inuence
taxpayers future compliance (like information on audits in, e.g., Alm et al., 2009, and
Gemmell and Ratto, 2012).
3 Modelling the behavior of tax sco­ aws
We develop here a stylized model of the individual choice about whether attempting to
escape the notication of a tax roll by changing address (or running away). Since our
main focus is to highlight the impact of a previous notication on the decision about
attempting to escape a subsequent notication, we build a simple two-period dynamic
model in which the Tax Authorities issue two (successive) tax rolls to be notied to
the taxpayer. The goal is to understand the impact of a tax notice in the rst period
on the decision to move in the second one.
A tax cheater has evaded taxes twice in the past. The Tax Administration has
detected both acts of misbehavior and it has issued two separate tax rolls that the tax-
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collection agency will try to notify at the tax evaders known address at di¤erent dates.
The tax cheater is perfectly informed about this; therefore, we represent her problem
as a two-stage decision tree, which is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage 1, the Agency
attempts to notify the rst tax roll, of amount f1 > 0, which includes due taxes plus
nes. Having anticipated the visit of the tax collector, the tax evader decides whether
to hide by changing address (h1 = 1), at a cost c > 0, or not to hide (h1 = 0), in which
case no cost is incurred. In the latter case, the tax roll is notied and the due amount
is collected. Instead, if the taxpayer runs away, then with probability 1  p, p 2 (0; 1),
she escapes notication and the payment of taxes and nes, whereas with probability
p she is discovered and the due amount is collected.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
Following the taxpayers decision and the notication outcome in stage 1, there
are three Decision Nodes in stage 2, which are labelled DN*, DN** and DN***. In
all nodes, the agency tries to notify the second tax roll, of amount f2 > 0, while the
tax evader has again to take the choice of whether attempting (hDN2 = 1), or not
attempting (hDN2 = 0), to escape the notication. Again, c is the cost of hiding and p
is the probability of notication for a running taxpayer.3
We assume that there is a large population of tax cheaters, each one characterized
by the level of her gross income, w > 0, and the amounts of the tax rolls, f1 and f2.
We also assume that the cost of hiding by changing address, c, as well as the detection
probability, p, are the same for all individuals. To simplify the analysis, we also make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For all taxpayers: (i) f1 > c and f2 > c; (ii) w   2c  f1   f2 > 0.
Assumption 1(i) allows us to focus only on those individuals for whom it may be worth
trying to escape the notication of the tax bills. In fact, it is never worth hiding by
bearing a cost which is greater than the due ne. Assumption 1(ii) holds that the tax
cheater has enough resources to pay for unsuccessful attempts to avoid the notication
of both tax rolls. In fact, it is reasonable to think that gross income w bears a positive
correlation with the level of tax evasion, which in turn is linked to the level of the due
nes f1 and f2.
3We assume that both the cost of hiding, c, and the probability of detection, p, are the same
in stages 1 and 2. One could argue that a taxpayer opting for hiding in stage 1, and that escaped
notication (hence moving from DN*** in stage 2), would incur a cost lower than c if opting to hide
also in stage 2. Instead, we assume that she bears the full cost c also in this case, for the reason that
this is the hypothesis which is less favorable to the theoretical prediction we are looking for, namely
that a notication in stage 1 reduces the probability of hiding in stage 2. Notice also that we are
assuming that the taxpayer knows in advance (in stage 1) that the tax collection agency will try to
notify two tax rolls of amounts f1 and f2. More realistically, we could have assumed that the rst tax
roll is issued with certainty, while the second one is issued with probability  < 1. In this case, ex-ante
(i.e., in stage 1) the issue of the second tax roll would be an uncertain event. This latter extension
would increase analytical complexity without adding relevant insights.
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Let T  R3+ be the (compact) set of taxpayerstypes, satisfying Assumption 1, with
t = fw; f1; f2g a typical element of T . We normalize the population mass to unity and
we denote with (w; f1; f2) the cumulative distribution function of taxpayerstypes.
We assume that all taxpayers have the same preferences over net income, x, which
are represented by the cardinal utility function u(x), three times continuously di¤er-
entiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. We also assume that preferences over
lotteries are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function.
Given the above assumptions, the problem of a typical taxpayer t 2 T is solved by
backward induction. Therefore, we begin by analyzing the second stage.
3.1 The second tax roll
While the choice (hide/do not hide) is the same in all stage 2 decision nodes, the nal
outcome is di¤erent, since each node is contingent on a di¤erent decision/outcome in
stage 1. In particular, if the taxpayer does not hide in stage 2, then her net income,
contingent on the decision node DN 2 f; ;   g, is equal to:
xDN2 = w
DN   f2,
where wDN is equal to:
w = w   c, if the taxpayer hides and is not caught in stage 1,
w = w   f1, if the taxpayer does not hide in stage 1,
w = w   c  f1, if the taxpayer hides and is caught in stage 1.
Note that, by Assumption 1(i):
w < w < w. (1)
If the taxpayer hides in stage 2, and then she is caught, her net income is equal to:
xDN1 = w
DN   c  f2.
Finally, if the taxpayer hides in stage 2, and then she is not caught, her net income
is equal to:
xDN3 = w
DN   c.
We are now ready to examine the taxpayers optimal choice at any given stage 2
decision node. Let EuDN be the expected utility of a taxpayer choosing to run away at
stage 2 decision node DN, and let CuDN be the certain utility of a taxpayer choosing
not to run away. At any given node DN, the taxpayer will change address if and only
if EuDN is strictly greater than CuDN, that is:
EuDN  (1  p)u(wDN   c) + pu(wDN   c  f2) > u(wDN   f2)  CuDN. (2)
Condition (2) can be expressed in terms of an inequality between the objective
probability of detection, p, and a type-specic probability, ~p(:), which makes (2) an
equality:
p <
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2)  ~p(w
DN; c; f2)  ~pDN. (3)
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Condition (3) says that taxpayers for whom ~pDN > p will hide at stage 2 decision
node DN, while those for whom ~pDN  p will not hide (we assume that those for whom
~pDN = p, being indi¤erent between hiding and not hiding, choose the latter option).
Notice that positive monotonicity of the utility function and Assumption 1(i) imply
that ~pDN < 1. These arguments are summarized in the following denition.
Denition 1 The break-even probability ~pDN, dened in Eq. (3), makes a taxpayer
indi¤erent between taking and not taking the risk of running away at a given decision
node DN 2 f; ;   g.
Next we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 2 For all 0 < c < f2, the break-even probability ~p(wDN; c; f2) is increas-
ing in wDN.
To interpret this assumption, di¤erentiate ~p(:) in Eq. (3) with respect to wDN:
@~pDN
@wDN
=
u0(wDN   c)  u0(wDN   f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2) 
u0(wDN   c)  u0(wDN   c  f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2) ~p
DN. (4)
Let x1 = wDN   c   f2, x2 = wDN   f2, x3 = wDN   c, with 0 < x1 < x2 <
x3 by Assumption 1. Substituting for ~pDN into Eq. (4), we see that the condition
@~pDN=@wDN > 0 stated in Assumption 2 is equivalent to the following inequality:
 u
0(x3)  u0(x2)
u(x3)  u(x2) <  
u0(x3)  u0(x1)
u(x3)  u(x1) . (5)
It is immediate to see that the assumption of risk aversion (u00 < 0), which implies
0 < u0(x2)   u0(x3) < u0(x1)   u0(x3), is a necessary condition for inequality (5) to
hold true, since it is 0 < u(x3) u(x2) < u(x3) u(x1) by positive monotonicity of the
utility function. In Appendix A we also show that a necessary condition for inequality
(5) to hold true is that u000 > 0, which captures the rather standard assumption of
prudence(the condition u000 > 0, combined with the assumption that u00 < 0, implies
that marginal utility, u0 > 0, is a decreasingly convex function of income). Moreover,
we show that although condition (5) is not equivalent to the familiar hypothesis of
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion, it is somewhat related to it. Therefore, condition
(5) denes a sense, distinct but similar to that of DARA, in which an individual is
more willing to accept a lottery as income increases. Finally, Appendix A shows that
condition (5) is satised by the widely used class of isoelastic utility functions, which
exhibit Constant Relative Risk Aversion, and therefore also DARA.
The break-even probability ~pDN is now used to partition the taxpayerspopulation
into di¤erent groups, according to the pattern of choices the individuals would make
at each one of the stage-two decision nodes. This partition represents the preliminary
step for dening the probability that a generic (i.e., a randomly drawn) taxpayer will
run away at any given stage-two decision node, conditional on the decision (hide/dont
hide), outcome (notied/not notied), at stage-one. These conditional probabilities,
which are formally derived in Section 3.3, represent the building block of the empirical
model of Section 4.
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Eq. (1) and Assumption 2 imply that, for all 0 < c < f2, the break-even probabil-
ities at the three stage-two decision nodes, ~p, ~p, and ~p, are such that:
~p(w; c; f2) < ~p(w; c; f2) < ~p(w; c; f2). (6)
In turn, the latter chain of inequalities implies that the set T of taxpayerstypes
can be divided into four disjoint subsets, which are dened as follows:
T000 = f t 2 T j ~p < ~p < ~p  pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 0, h2 = 0,
T001 = f t 2 T j ~p < ~p  p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 0, h2 = 1,
T011 = f t 2 T j ~p  p < ~p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 1, h2 = 1,
T111 = f t 2 T j p < ~p < ~p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 1, h2 = 1, h2 = 1.
The subsets dened above read as follows. The subset T011, for instance, contains
all taxpayers types that would choose not to hide at node DN* but would hide at
nodes DN** and DN***.
Let
nj =
ZZZ
t2Tj
d(w; f1; f2), j 2 J = f000; 001; 011; 111g , (7)
be the mass of taxpayers belonging to subset Tj , j 2 J , dened above. By construction,P
j2J nj = 1.
3.2 The rst tax roll
We now turn to the taxpayers decision at stage 1. If the taxpayer chooses to hide at
stage 1, and taking into account her optimal choices at stage 2 nodes DN*** and DN*,
her expected utility is equal to:
Eu(h1 = 1) = (1  p)max fEu;Cug+ pmax fEu;Cug ,
where EuDN and CuDN are dened in Eq. (2). If, instead, the taxpayer chooses not to
hide at stage 1, her expected utility is equal to:
Eu(h1 = 0) = max fEu;Cug .
Hence, the taxpayer will hide at stage 1 if and only if Eu(h1 = 1) > Eu(h1 = 0).
Denote with qj , j 2 J , the share of taxpayers belonging to subgroup Tj that opt for
hiding at stage 1. The total mass of taxpayers hiding at stage 1, i.e., the probability
that a generic taxpayer t 2 T chooses h1 = 1 at stage 1, is therefore equal to:
Pr(h1 = 1) =
X
j2J
njqj = n000q000 + n001q001 + n011q011 + n111q111. (8)
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3.3 Probabilities of hiding at stage 2 decision nodes
By combining the population shares nj and qj , we can nally dene the probability
that a generic taxpayer called to take a decision at stage 2 node DN will opt for hiding
away from the tax authority. Consider, for instance, node DN***. The taxpayers that
choose h2 = 1 are those belonging to the subsets Tk, of mass nk, k 2 f001; 011; 111g. A
fraction (1 p)qk of the taxpayers belonging to these subsets have chosen to hide at stage
1 (h1 = 1) and have subsequently escaped notication (recall that the probability of
notication, p, is type independent). Therefore, the probability that a generic taxpayer
taking a decision at node DN*** opts for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and not notied) =
n001q001 + n011q011 + n111q111
Pr(h1 = 1)
. (9)
Similarly, the probability that a generic taxpayer taking a decision at node DN*
opts for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and notied) =
n111q111
Pr(h1 = 1)
. (10)
Finally, the probability that a generic taxpayer taking a decision at node DN** opts
for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 0, notied) =
n011(1  q011) + n111(1  q111)
1  Pr(h1 = 1) . (11)
By comparing Eq. (9) with Eq. (10), we immediately obtain the main theoretical
result that motivates the empirical investigation of Section 4.
Proposition 1 The probability, dened in Eq. (10), that a generic taxpayer who has
run away and has been notied in stage 1 also runs away in stage 2 is lower than the
probability, dened in Eq. (9), that a generic taxpayer who has run away and has not
been notied in stage 1 also runs away in stage 2.
Proposition 1 shows that taxpayers that do not succeed in running away in stage 1
are less likely to run away also in stage 2 than taxpayers that escape the tax notice
in stage 1. In other terms, and taking stage 2 as a reference point, the experience
of a prior tax notice is e¤ective against sco­ aws: it reduces the probability that a
generic taxpayer attempts to escape the current tax notice. This is exactly the main
relationship which is tested in the following empirical section. The intuition of the
result is simple. Taxpayers that unsuccessfully attempt to escape the tax notice in
stage 1 su¤er a negative income e¤ect, compared to taxpayers that successfully run
away, since the former bear both the cost of changing address and the cost of paying
due taxes plus nes, while the latter bear only the cost of changing address. Given that,
by condition (5) implied by Assumption 2, a negative income e¤ect makes individuals
less prone to take risks, some of the unsuccessful stage 1 sco­ aws rationally decide not
to take chances in stage 2.
Before moving to the empirical section of the paper  where we provide rst
evidence on the correlation between a previous tax notice and the probability of trying
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to escape a subsequent tax notice  two nal remarks are in order. The rst concerns
the type of correlation we disentangle in practice. In our empirical specication, see Eq.
(12) below, the probability of running away by changing address is conditioned only on a
previous notication of a tax roll, and not on previous decisions about address changes.
In terms of our theoretical model, see Figure 1, this means that the comparison we make
with the empirical model is between the probability of running away by taxpayers
moving from stage 2 decision node DN*** and the group of taxpayers moving from
decision node DN*. Comparing taxpayers moving from node DN*** with those moving
from node DN** would require both a more general theoretical model (i.e., a model
with more than two stages, in which the choice of whether running away at stage 1 is
conditioned on having received a previous tax notice), and a dynamic empirical model
(i.e., a model in which the probability of changing address in the current period is a
function of address changes sometime in the previous periods).4
The second remark concerns the assumption of taking the original tax evasion de-
cision as exogenously given, which is implicit in our theoretical framework. Indeed, if
the taxpayer is assumed to be forward looking, the details of the notication process are
likely to have an inuence also on the original evasion decision. For a given evasion level,
an increase in the probability of notication reduces the expected utility from evasion
(even after the taxpayer adjusts, if necessary, her changing address decision). Then,
as a rst reaction, a risk-averse taxpayer might reduce the level of tax evasion, which
then in turn might decrease the probability of hiding to escape notication (because,
for instance, the costs of hiding are now greater than the due ne; see Assumption 1
above). However, given the substantial time lag for the audit and detection by Tax
Authorities to occur with respect to the year of original evasion decision (at least ve
to seven years), this argument does not seem to pose a serious problem both for our
theoretical argument and  most importantly  for our empirical test, to which now
we turn.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and variables
For our empirical test, we exploit information on individual post-audit, post-detection
tax compliance les from seven distinct datasets referring to well-developed small- and
medium-sized provinces located in Northern Italy (Aosta, Belluno, Mantova, Modena,
Pordenone, Trento, and Treviso), including both residents and non-residents individu-
als. Since these provinces are similar in terms of per-capita income and demographic
characteristics, but di¤er somewhat as for their historical-cultural background and
political orientation, we consider separately the two samples of residents and non-
residents.5 Notice that relying on datasets concerning di¤erent social contexts for
4For the sake of completeness, notice that, while it is not possible to rule out that the probability
dened in Eq. (11) is greater than those dened in Eqs. (9) and (10), for most cases of interest it is
instead lower. Numerical simulations of the model, available from the authors upon request, show that
taxpayers that do not run away in stage 1 are usually less likely to run away in stage 2 than taxpayers
that behave as sco­ aws in stage 1.
5On the contrary, we eliminated from the original samples all individuals for whom the place of
residence is unknown. The main ndings presented here are not a¤ected by this choice. Estimates
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assessing the relationship between tax notices and unlawful behavior allows us to check
the robustness of our results with respect to sample perturbations.6
All data have been provided by the same agency (Uniriscossione S.p.A.), which was
the sole responsible for the enforcement of tax collection in all the seven provinces,
and refer to the universe of tax rolls issued in these provinces during the period 2004-
2007. The data provide information on individuals that (at least once) decided not to
regularly pay their taxes (or other revenue receipts) in the past, largely before 2004,
and were audited and detected by Tax Authorities. The complete dataset includes
about 250,000 observations: as for residents, we have 10,090 total observations for the
Aosta sample, 4,187 for Belluno, 24,078 for Mantova, 64,975 for Modena, 13,527 for
Pordenone, 18,575 for Trento, and 33,356 for Treviso; as for non-residents, we have
5,707 total observations for the Aosta sample, 2,923 for Belluno, 8,675 for Mantova,
24,622 for Modena, 6,117 for Pordenone, 9,270 for Trento, and 20,444 for Treviso.
The original data unit is the individuals tax return form. As described in Section
2, the rolls periodically issued by Tax Authorities are sent to the collection agency,
so that the latter registers the amount due by each individual for a given period in a
tax return form. For each individuals tax return form, our data include information
on: the gender and the age of the tax evader; the Municipality (if the individual is
Italian) or the State (for foreigners) where the tax evader was born; her residence
address (that allows us to distinguish the two samples of residents and non-residents);
eventual address changes with respect to the previous tax return form; the presence of
a previous tax return form successfully notied, from 2004 onwards; the taxpayersdue
amount. Notice that no data are available on the taxpayersincomes or family status,
an issue on which we return below.
From these original data, we dened the variables to be used in our empirical models.
In particular, our dependent variable is Prob_ADCHANGE, a dummy variable which
takes value one when the individual changed her address with respect to the previous
tax return form.7 Starting from a previous tax return form successfully notied, we
build our main regressor, NOT, a dummy variable which takes value one when the
individual experienced a prior tax notice.8 We also control for the taxpayers due
amount. Unfortunately, available information is relative only to the whole due amount
of each tax return form, accrued to each individual in the period which the form refers
to, but not to the categoryof taxes cheated. These include evaded taxes plus penalties,
as well as other non-tax debts  such as royalty rents, nes for tra¢ c violations and
licence fees. Given the absence of any information on the categoryof taxes cheated, to
provide a rough control for this we clustered the total due amount into four classes and
dened a dummy variable for each class (TAX1, TAX2, TAX3, TAX4, from less than
100 euro to more than 50,000 euro). Fees and nes usually fall in the lowest classes,
while taxes are more likely to be found in the highest ones. Finally, in order to take
based on the whole samples are available from the authors upon request.
6 Indeed, political ideology and cultural framework are likely to inuence tax evasion behaviour; see,
e.g., Cannari and DAlessio (2007) for a discussion based on survey data.
7 It is worth highlighting that the collection agency has an incentive to search for taxpayers, since it
receives a xed price for each notied tax debt. Hence the number of address changes is not a¤ected
by an opportunistic behaviour of the collection agency.
8 It is worth mentioning that the tax notice has been experienced from 2004 onwards, hence the
original tax evasion decision is referred to at least ve to seven years before.
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into account residual heterogeneity across sco­ aws  which could a¤ect their decision
to move  we include in the estimated models control variables for some cultural
factors highlighted by the literature to be important in inuencing tax compliance
 like gender, age, and the birth place  considering the variables FEM (a dummy
for females); AGE1 to AGE5 (a set of dummies for age, from individuals between 18
and 25 years old to individuals more than 65 years old); a rich set of dummies for
the birthplace (including four Italian macro-areas, and nine world zones). Additional
controls for unobserved heterogeneity stemming from di¤erences in taxpayers socio-
economic conditions (like the type of occupation) exploits the panel structure of the
data, considering a FIXED EFFECTS (FE) specication of the empirical model. This is
also a rough control for the attitudeto move, which may have inuenced the decision
to run away in the past.
As remarked above, our dataset does not include information on two variables that
are potentially relevant for explaining taxpayersbehavior. The rst is gross income (the
variable w in the theoretical model presented in Section 3); the second is net income,
as a result of the outcome (notied/not notied) of a previous tax roll (the variable
wDN in the theoretical model, that is net income at the end of stage 1 of the decision
tree). In our theoretical and empirical frameworks, gross income represents a sort
of permanent income, which determines the time-invariant components of individual
attitudes toward risks, those that can be subsumed in the xed e¤ects version of the
empirical model. As we are unable to control for net income, which in our framework
takes the role of current income, we rely on the fact that the dummy variable NOT
represents also a proxy measure for it. In fact, since, ceteris paribus, net income after
a successful notication is lower than net income after an unsuccessful notication, the
two variables are likely to show a signicant degree of correlation.
Table 1 lists all the variables used in the empirical analysis, together with their
corresponding denitions. Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our em-
pirical exercise, distinguishing between the two samples of residents and non-residents,
and each province separately, are in Table 2, while statistics for the remaining vari-
ables are in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The probability of address change and of having
received a prior notice are clearly di¤erent between residents and non-residents. Con-
sidering the pooled samples, 53.6% of resident individuals changed their addresses,
compared with only 35.7% of non-residents. The corresponding means for the variable
NOT are 14.2% and 7.4%, respectively. We do not observe large di¤erences across
provinces with respect to these averages. As for residents, Prob_ADCHANGE ranges
from 51.2% in the case of Modena to 60.3% in the case of Aosta, while NOT goes from
9.7% for Aosta to 16.3% for Treviso. As for non-residents, Prob_ADCHANGE ranges
from 31.2% in the case of Belluno to 38.8% in the case of Modena, while NOT goes
from 5.2% for Belluno to 9% for Treviso. Despite these di¤erences, the distribution
of the amount of due taxes is somewhat similar across the two samples: in about one
fth of the tax return forms the due amount is lower than 100 euro, for both residents
and non-residents. The large majority of tax forms (about 60%) refers to amounts
between 100 euro and 2,000 euro. Less than one percent of observations are relative to
amounts above 50,000 euro. Also demographic characteristics of the two samples are
pretty much similar: most of the individuals are males (about 80%), half of which are
between 35 and 50 years old.
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<Insert Table 1 about here>
<Insert Table 2 about here>
4.2 Estimation strategy
Starting from the theoretical model described in Section 3, we investigate the rela-
tionship between the taxpayers choice of running away and the receipt of a previous
tax notice by estimating di¤erent LOGIT model specications. Our dependent variable
Prob_ADCHANGE is measured here by the probability of changing residence address,
which is assumed to be idiosyncratic to each sco­ aw. The POOLED specication of
the LOGIT model is represented by the following equation:
(Prob_ADCHANGEi = 1j zi) = F
0@+ NOTi + 4X
j=1
jTAXji +
X
k
kXki
1A , (12)
where the dependent, NOT and TAXj variables are dened as before; zi is the vector
of explicative factors for the decision to runaway; F (:) is the Logistic CDF; nally,
Xki are the elements of Xi, the vector of demographic controls (including dummies
for gender, age, and the birth place) which provide a rough control for heterogeneity
across sco­ aws, including also cultural di¤erences with respect to tax compliance. To
explicitly allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we also estimate Eq. (12) with
a panel specication including individual xed e¤ects. Such a FE LOGIT specication
helps us to clear the correlation between prior notices and the probability to move from
those of other important taxpayers characteristics (xed, or quasi-xed, over a short
time period, at least in Italy) which could inuence both the upstream opportunity
to evade and the subsequent decision of moving, like the permanent income level, the
attitudeto move, the type of job (e.g., public sector employees, self-employed workers,
etc.), the family status and the homeownership status.9
Notice that running FE LOGIT estimations helps to mitigate also the biases due
to potential endogeneity problems a¤ecting our key variable NOT. Indeed, as NOT
reects something like the past interaction of tax evaders with Tax Authorities, this
variable might be correlated with past individual decision to evade taxes. Given that
someone who was prepared to evade taxes in the past is also more likely to cheat
Tax Authorities now, both our dependent variable and NOT will be correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the individual that make her more/less prone to evade
taxes.
An additional (and connected) problem which could bias our results is due to the
potential inuence of NOT on the ex-ante amount of taxes evaded. However, as we
already observed, given the relevant time lag with which Tax Authorities e¤ectively
audit (from ve to seven years) and then notice (from one to three years) taxpayers
and the four-years span of our dataset, all the tax forms observed in our sample include
9For reasons of taxpayers privacy, this information about individual socio-economic attributes has
not been released by the collection agency. The inclusion of individual xed e¤ects permits also to take
into account individual-specic costs of moving, which cannot be measured directly.
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evaded amounts which have not been a¤ected by any of the tax notices observed in the
same sample.
As a nal robustness check, we estimate the FE version of the LOGIT model (12)
separately for the sub-samples of males and females. This allows us to control for
potential sample selection biases in our results. Indeed, as suggested by, e.g., Croson
and Gneezy (2009), females are usually less likely to take extremechoices  such as,
for instance, evade taxes or running away  and this result could turn out in samples
with female groups inated by worse sco­ aw behaviors compared to the male ones.
4.3 Results
Estimates of Eq. (12) on the samples of residents and non-residents individuals (re-
ported in Appendix B, from Table B.2 to Table B.7) o¤er a consistent picture  both
across provinces and alternative model specications  of sco­ awsbehavior in terms
of the relationship between the decision to run away and a previous tax notice. All the
estimations consider as a reference individual a taxpayer that did not receive any prior
notice (NOT = 0) and with a due amount above 50,000 euro (TAX4 = 1).10
A rst clear result emerging from our exercises is that residents and non-residents
are completely di¤erent individuals. Wald tests strongly conrm model validity for the
sample of residents only. Indeed, for non-residents, while Wald tests on the POOLED
specication are apparently conrming model validity, Wald tests on the FE specica-
tion strongly reject our model. All the coe¢ cients, but for some demographic controls
in the POOLED specications, are statistically insignicant at the usual conventional
levels. A likely interpretation is that non-residents are a bunch of highly heterogeneous
taxpayers, in terms of where they currently live, and the motivations for changing their
addresses (e.g., they moved simply because they changed their job). In what follows,
we then concentrate on the sample of resident individuals only.
Table 3 presents coe¢ cient and marginal e¤ect estimates for NOT, for all the
provinces and all our models. The estimated coe¢ cient is consistently negative and
statistically signicant across all the specications, including POOLED and FE LOGIT
models.11 This indicates that the presence of a prior notice is associated with a reduced
probability of changing address, highlighting a likely deterrent role similar to that of
a prior audit pointed out by part of the empirical literature based on both laboratory
experiments (e.g., Spicer and Hero, 1985; Webley, 1987; Alm et al., 2009) and real
data (e.g., Bergman and Nevarez, 2006; Gemmell and Ratto, 2012). The magnitude
of the marginal e¤ects is also very similar across the di¤erent provinces and the dif-
ferent models, with most of the estimates around  10% and somewhat higher for just
10 In the POOLED specication of LOGIT model, including also age and gender dummies, we
have assumed the reference sco­ aw to have an age between 18 and 25 (AGE1 = 1) and to be male
(FEM = 0).
11The robustness of our estimates after including individual xed e¤ects strongly suggests that the
potential problem of endogeneity of NOT, as well as of TAX1-TAX4 discussed below, is not a major
issue here. Indeed, as we already remarked, the long lag with which the notice usually occurs makes our
regressors truly exogenous. Notice that the number of total observations available for each province
signicantly reduces when running FE LOGIT models, since all the individuals with only one tax
return form have been dropped due to the inability of estimating the individual-specic xed e¤ect in
these cases.
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two provinces only (Treviso,  17%, and Belluno,  23%). This result suggests that
sco­ awsreactions to the enforcement e¤orts by Tax Authorities are likely to be inde-
pendent from the specic geographical context where the individuals live. Comparing
the male-only and female-only sub-samples, we nd that the degree of association is
higher for females than for males, in ve out of seven provinces, with Trento and Treviso
being the only exceptions. However, since the individuals belonging to our datasets
are extracted from the population of tax evaders, it is di¢ cult to advance any specic
interpretation for gender di¤erences in behavior.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
To better study the relationship between Prob_ADCHANGE and the prior notice,
we further estimated average predicted probabilities from the POOLED LOGIT model
(Table 4), considering also the role of the due amount and of demographic variables.12
Results from this additional exercise conrm the view that the prior notice shows
sizable negative correlations with the probability to runaway in order to escape notice,
which is consistent across di¤erent provinces, di¤erent amounts, and di¤erent ages.
First, considering the averages across all individuals in the provincial samples, the
probability of changing address without having received a previous notice is between
53% and 61%, and reduces to between 52% and 38%. Most of the estimated correlations
of Prob_ADCHANGE and NOT are around 10-12%, but for Belluno (23%) and Treviso
(17%). In most cases (but for Aosta), the probability of running away to escape notice
is below the 50% threshold, somewhat suggesting that the notice is potentially able to
deter individuals from running away. Second, we do not nd a clear pattern for the
magnitude of the association between tax notices and the probability of running away
across the di¤erent classes of the due amount of taxes. Only in the case of Belluno
(and, to some extent, Aosta), the predicted probability of changing address is clearly
increasing in the level of tax debt, both considering NOT = 0 and NOT = 1. In the
remaining provinces, we nd the opposite trend, or a constant probability of moving
across di¤erent classes. However, the estimated reduction in the probability of moving
is remarkably similar, for amounts of less than 100 euro to tax debts of more than 50,000
euro. Again, Belluno is an exception, since we observe a 4 percentage points reduction
in the estimated correlation between NOT and TAX4 with respect to the other classes,
which is consistent with expectations. Notice that, in this case, the probability of
running away after having received a prior notice is still 62% (from 80%), suggesting
that NOT is likely to be ine¤ective in deterring individuals from changing address
to escape notice. Third, females are characterized by a higher probability of moving
than males in all provinces, both considering an individual without a prior notice and
an individual with a prior notice. As discussed above, this evidence might be due to
a sample selection bias, since individuals included here are mostly tax cheaters. It
is worth pointing out that the estimated negative correlation with NOT is, however,
12For the sake of brevity, we do not report here birth zone e¤ects. Notice, however, that these
variables are almost always negative, suggesting that individuals borne in places di¤erent from where
they actually live are probably less familiar with the social and economic context, and hence they run
away less.
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largely conrmed on both sub-samples. Finally, considering age, we observe a large
increase in the probability of running away when age increases, which is consistent
across di¤erent provinces. Despite the negative correlation with NOT, aged individuals
in our samples are characterized by a larger probability of moving with respect to sample
averages. In the case of Aosta, for instance, predicted probabilities for those older than
65 (AGE5) are 68% and 58% respectively, again suggesting that notice is likely to be
ine¤ective in deterring illegal behaviors. Notice that the probability of running away
is larger than 50% in all provinces for individuals in the AGE5 class.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
On the whole, our empirical test on the relationship between a prior tax notice
and the probability to run away suggests that, for most individuals, the experience of
a notice goes in the right direction and is signicantly associated with a reduction in
the probability of running away. However, some individuals, still prefer to change ad-
dress and avoid paying the bill. This evidence points toward an hysteresis in the illegal
behavior of tax evaders, with prior notice mostly ine¤ective against some sco­ aws.
Our ndings can help to explain the inability of tax collection agencies in cashing due
amounts from noncompliant taxpayers observed in the real world: according to the
latest estimates provided by the Agency for Internal Revenues (Agenzia delle Entrate),
in Italy, only 1.57% of the total amount on taxpayersrolls has been cashed in 2007; but
the same is true also in the US, where about 60% of identied tax debts are never col-
lected (Burman, 2003). Moreover, the evidence of a likely weak e¤ectiveness of a prior
tax notice is also consistent with the results by Bergman and Nevarez (2006) on VAT
audit enforcement in Chile and Argentina: even if tax audits seem to exert a discour-
aging impact towards those more prone to compliance, they have the undesired e¤ect
of furthering non-compliance among strong cheaters, who again exhibit an hysteresis
in their illegal behavior that enforcement activity is not able to stop.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the relationship between the experience of a tax notice and
the individual future compliance behavior after having being detected as a cheater.
Di¤erently from previous literature on tax evasion decision, we focus here on a post-
audit, post-detectioncontext, i.e., a framework in which taxpayers have been already
detected by Tax Authorities as noncompliant and they can decide to runaway in order
to escape the notice and avoid paying their tax debt, behaving as sco­ aws. The
problem is substantial for at least two reasons: rst, only a small percentage of the
total amount of due taxes on taxpayersrolls is actually cashed by collection agencies
every year; second, available information indicates that in many cases the taxpayers
address is unknown, and a considerable number of individuals change residence address
several times so as to avoid tax notice consequences.
We rst provide a theoretical framework, by proposing a two-period dynamic model
to study the individual choice of running away. We show that, for risk averse individu-
als, a prior tax notice is likely to reduce the probability of attempting to escape a
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subsequent tax notice by changing address. The empirical analysis  which is based
on real data provided by an Italian tax collection agency  highlights a signicant neg-
ative correlation between the experience of a tax notice and the probability of changing
address.
Our results suggest that future research on tax evasion should give more thoughts
to the post-detection, post-auditprocedures, as these are likely to be as important
as deterrence in inuencing the impact of the illegal behavior of tax evasion on public
nances. Discouraging and discovering tax cheating is just a rst step, which lacks
power if  at the end  governments are unable to really cash the due amounts.
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Appendix A: Theoretical model
The interpretation of inequality (5)
Using integrals, inequality (5) can be written in the following equivalent form:
  1
x3   x2
R x3
x2
u00(x) dx
1
x3   x2
R x3
x2
u0(x) dx
<
  1
x3   x1
R x3
x1
u00(x) dx
1
x3   x1
R x3
x1
u0(x) dx
. (A.1)
Each side of the inequality contains the ratio between the average value of the second order
derivative of the utility function on a given interval of income and the average value of its rst
order derivative on the same interval. Strict concavity of the utility function implies that:
1
x3   x2
Z x3
x2
u0(x) dx <
1
x3   x1
Z x3
x1
u0(x) dx.
Hence, a necessary condition for inequality (A.1) to hold true is that:
  1
x3   x2
Z x3
x2
u00(x) dx <   1
x3   x1
Z x3
x1
u00(x) dx,
which in turn holds true if and only if u000(x) > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for inequality
(A.1) to hold true, as well as for the equivalent inequality (5), is that the marginal utility of
income, u0(x), is a su¢ ciently convex function of income.
Notice also that condition (A.1) bears some resemblance to the standard condition that the
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion,  u00(x)=u0(x), is a decreasing function of income. If the
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utility function u(:) exhibits DARA, then
d( u00(x)=u0(x))
dx
=  u
000u0   (u00)2
(u0)2
< 0.
Clearly, u000 > 0 is a necessary condition for the latter inequality to hold true. For any
triplet of scalars fx1; x2; x3g, such that 0 < x1 < x2 < x3, DARA also implies that:
 
Z x3
x2
u00(x)
u0(x)
dx <  
Z x3
x1
u00(x)
u0(x)
dx. (A.2)
Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are similar but not equivalent.13 However, u000(x) > 0 is a
necessary condition for both inequalities to hold true.
CRRA utility functions
Consider the class of isoelastic utility functions:
u(x) =
x1 
1   ,  > 0,  6= 1, (A.3)
where  represents the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. It is immediate to see that u0(x) =
x  > 0, u00(x) =  x (1+) < 0, u000(x) = (1 + )x (2+) > 0.
Given the utility function (A.3), inequality (5) is written as:
(1  ) x
 
3   x 2
x1 3   x1 2
> (1  ) x
 
3   x 1
x1 3   x1 1
.
If 0 <  < 1, the latter inequality can be written as:
 x 2 x1 3   x 3 x1 1 + x 2 x1 1 >  x 1 x1 3   x 3 x1 2 + x 1 x1 2 . (A.4)
Simplifying we get:
x3   x1
x3x

1
  x3   x2
x3x

2
  x2   x1
x2x

1
> 0.
The latter condition can then be written as:
x2(x3   x1)  x3(x2   x1)  x1(x3   x2) > 0.
Finally, by adding and subtracting x2(x2   x1), the latter inequality can be written as:
x2   x1
x2   x1 >
x3   x2
x3   x2 , (A.5)
which holds true, since 0 < x1 < x2 < x3 by construction, and since the function x is strictly
concave for 0 <  < 1.
The proof for  > 1 is similar. In this case, the inequality sign in Eqs. (A.4) through (A.5)
is reversed. The latter inequality then holds true since the function x is strictly convex for
 > 1.
13The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is usually employed to assess how changes of an exogenous
variable a¤ect the optimal (interior) solution of a continuous variable of choice. Since in our model the
choice is discrete, we have a similar, but not equivalent, condition.
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Appendix B: Additional tables of the empirical analysis
Tables from B.1 to B7.
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Table 1. Definition of the variables used in the estimated LOGIT models 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Prob_ADCHANGE Probability that the individual runs away to escape tax notice 
NOT 1: the individual has experienced a prior notice 
TAX1 1: the amount of the tax roll is until 100 € 
TAX2 1: the amount of the tax roll is between 101 and 2,000 € 
TAX3 1: the amount of the tax roll is between 2,001 and 50,000 € 
TAX4 1: the amount of the tax roll is over 50,000 € 
FEM 1: the individual is a female 
AGE1 1: the age of the individual is between 18 and 25 
AGE2 1: the age of the individual is between 26 and 35 
AGE3 1: the age of the individual is between 36 and 50 
AGE4 1: the age of the individual is between 51 and 65 
AGE5 1: the age of the individual is over 65 
 
 Table 2. Summary statistics of the main variables (used in all the estimated LOGIT models) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO POOLED SAMPLES 
Sample of resident individuals 
 mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
Prob_ADCHANGE 0.603 0.489 0.570 0.495 0.527 0.499 0.512 0.500 0.563 0.496 0.540 0.498 0.554 0.497 0.536 0.499 
NOT 0.097 0.296 0.160 0.367 0.115 0.320 0.153 0.360 0.126 0.332 0.135 0.342 0.163 0.370 0.142 0.349 
TAX1 0.242 0.428 0.257 0.437 0.219 0.414 0.204 0.403 0.231 0.422 0.230 0.421 0.235 0.424 0.221 0.415 
TAX2 0.594 0.491 0.567 0.496 0.602 0.490 0.648 0.478 0.627 0.484 0.610 0.488 0.581 0.493 0.617 0.486 
TAX3 0.161 0.367 0.171 0.377 0.176 0.380 0.145 0.352 0.139 0.346 0.157 0.363 0.181 0.385 0.159 0.366 
TAX4 0.003 0.054 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.058 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.049 0.004 0.064 0.003 0.055 0.003 0.055 
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 168,788 
Sample of non-resident individuals 
 mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
Prob_ADCHANGE 0.375 0.484 0.312 0.464 0.339 0.473 0.388 0.487      0.321      0.467       0.335     0.472  0.349 0.477 0.357 0.479 
NOT 0.067 0.250 0.052 0.223 0.069 0.254 0.078 0.268      0.059      0.235       0.055     0.229  0.090 0.286 0.074 0.262 
TAX1 0.278 0.448 0.195 0.396 0.208 0.406 0.201 0.400      0.214      0.410       0.224     0.417  0.224 0.417 0.217 0.412 
TAX2 0.590 0.492 0.585 0.493 0.631 0.482 0.628 0.483      0.644      0.479       0.600     0.490  0.592 0.491 0.613 0.487 
TAX3 0.131 0.338 0.218 0.413 0.159 0.366 0.169 0.375      0.140      0.347       0.173     0.379  0.180 0.384 0.168 0.374 
TAX4 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.049 0.001 0.036 0.002 0.042      0.002      0.049       0.002     0.048  0.003 0.058 0.002 0.047 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 77,758 
 
  
 
Table 3. Coefficient and marginal effect estimates for NOT – sample of resident individuals 
  POOLED LOGIT model FE LOGIT model FE LOGIT model (male only) FE LOGIT model (female only) 
 Province Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. 
AOSTA -0.391*** 0.068 -0.096*** 0.018 -0.421*** 0.090 -0.074*** 0.026 -0.334*** 0.118 -0.060** 0.026 -0.710*** 0.216 -0.108* 0.058 
BELLUNO -0.918*** 0.089 -0.226*** 0.022 -0.782*** 0.151 -0.122*** 0.045 -0.755*** 0.188 -0.106** 0.046 -0.900** 0.353 -0.211 0.156 
MANTOVA -0.441*** 0.041 -0.110*** 0.010 -0.416*** 0.080 -0.103*** 0.017 -0.403*** 0.085 -0.100*** 0.018 -0.484*** 0.161 -0.117*** 0.043 
MODENA -0.445*** 0.022 -0.111*** 0.005 -0.438*** 0.037 -0.109*** 0.008 -0.427*** 0.044 -0.106*** 0.009 -0.476*** 0.068 -0.116*** 0.017 
PORDENONE -0.496*** 0.053 -0.123*** 0.014 -0.364*** 0.082 -0.089*** 0.021 -0.361*** 0.096 -0.088*** 0.020 -0.384** 0.182 -0.095** 0.045 
TRENTO -0.442*** 0.044 -0.110*** 0.012 -0.313*** 0.078 -0.072*** 0.016 -0.330*** 0.081 -0.076*** 0.018 -0.247 0.157 -0.051 0.038 
TREVISO -0.681*** 0.030 -0.169*** 0.007 -0.580*** 0.058 -0.137*** 0.013 -0.628*** 0.064 -0.145*** 0.015 -0.365*** 0.107 -0.081** 0.039 
 
 
  
Table 4. Average predicted probabilities from POOLED LOGIT model – sample of resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
NOT 0 1 D 0 1 D 0 1 D 0 1 D 0 1 D 0 1 D 0 1 D 
All 0.61 0.52 -10% 0.61 0.38 -23% 0.54 0.43 -11% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.58 0.46 -12% 0.55 0.45 -11% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
TAX1 = 1 0.60 0.50 -10% 0.59 0.36 -23% 0.54 0.44 -10% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.59 0.47 -12% 0.55 0.43 -12% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
TAX2 = 1 0.61 0.52    -9% 0.62 0.39 -23% 0.54 0.44 -10% 0.53 0.43 -10% 0.59 0.46 -13% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.58 0.42 -16% 
TAX3 = 1 0.63 0.54    -9% 0.59 0.37 -22% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.50 0.39 -11% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
TAX4 = 1 0.70 -  - 0.80 0.62 -18% 0.45 0.34 -11% 0.42 0.32 -10% 0.49 0.33 -16% 0.51 0.39 -12% 0.58 0.42 -16% 
FEM = 0 0.60 0.51 -10% 0.60 0.37 -23% 0.53 0.43 -11% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.57 0.45 -12% 0.55 0.44 -11% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
FEM = 1 0.64 0.54 -10% 0.65 0.42 -23% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.61 0.49 -12% 0.58 0.47 -11% 0.61 0.44 -17% 
AGE1 = 1 0.54 0.46    -8% 0.50 0.29 -21% 0.51 0.40 -11% 0.47 0.36 -10% 0.49 0.37 -12% 0.50 0.40 -10% 0.55 0.38 -17% 
AGE2 = 1 0.59 0.50 -10% 0.59 0.37 -22% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.51 0.40 -11% 0.55 0.43 -12% 0.54 0.43 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
AGE3 = 1 0.61 0.52    -9% 0.60 0.38 -22% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.52 0.42 -11% 0.58 0.45 -12% 0.55 0.44 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
AGE4 = 1 0.61 0.52 -10% 0.64 0.41 -23% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.60 0.48 -12% 0.58 0.47 -11% 0.60 0.43 -17% 
AGE5 = 1 0.68 0.58 -10% 0.70 0.51 -20% 0.64 0.54 -10% 0.63 0.52 -11% 0.68 0.57 -11% 0.66 0.55 -11% 0.68 0.52 -16% 
 APPENDIX B: : Additional tables of the empirical analysis  
Table B.1. Summary statistics of the control variables (used in the estimated POOLED LOGIT model) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO POOLED SAMPLES 
Sample of resident individuals 
 mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
FEM 0.225 0.418 0.157 0.364 0.164 0.370 0.206 0.404 0.196 0.397 0.180 0.384 0.186 0.389 0.192 0.394 
AGE1 0.019 0.137 0.031 0.172 0.021 0.142 0.021 0.143 0.017 0.129 0.025 0.157 0.020 0.140 0.021 0.143 
AGE2 0.198 0.398 0.228 0.419 0.264 0.441 0.244 0.430 0.219 0.413 0.241 0.428 0.235 0.424 0.240 0.427 
AGE3 0.483 0.500 0.467 0.499 0.497 0.500 0.512 0.500 0.505 0.500 0.487 0.500 0.498 0.500 0.501 0.500 
AGE4 0.256 0.436 0.235 0.424 0.180 0.385 0.188 0.390 0.222 0.416 0.213 0.409 0.208 0.406 0.201 0.401 
AGE5 0.045 0.207 0.039 0.194 0.038 0.191 0.035 0.185 0.038 0.191 0.034 0.181 0.039 0.194 0.037 0.189 
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 168,788 
Sample of non-resident individuals 
 mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
FEM 0.235 0.424 0.175 0.380 0.162 0.368 0.194 0.396 0.179 0.383 0.170 0.375 0.176 0.381 0.184 0.387 
AGE1 0.013 0.115 0.023 0.149 0.017 0.129 0.019 0.136 0.013 0.111 0.023 0.149 0.024 0.152 0.020 0.139 
AGE2 0.187 0.390 0.205 0.404 0.233 0.423 0.241 0.428 0.199 0.399 0.235 0.424 0.232 0.422 0.228 0.420 
AGE3 0.475 0.499 0.472 0.499 0.463 0.499 0.470 0.499 0.469 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.466 0.499 0.468 0.499 
AGE4 0.271 0.444 0.267 0.443 0.232 0.422 0.224 0.417 0.269 0.443 0.235 0.424 0.235 0.424 0.238 0.426 
AGE5 0.054 0.227 0.033 0.178 0.055 0.228 0.045 0.208 0.051 0.220 0.043 0.202 0.043 0.203 0.046 0.210 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 77,758 
 Table B.2. Coefficient estimates from POOLED LOGIT model – sample of resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.391 0.068 *** -0.918 0.089 *** -0.441 0.041 *** -0.445 0.022 *** -0.496 0.053 *** -0.442 0.044 *** -0.681 0.030 *** 
TAX1 -0.459 0.409  -1.004 0.462 ** 0.450 0.226 ** 0.443 0.160 *** 0.417 0.351  0.179 0.235  0.014 0.209  
TAX2 -0.364 0.408  -0.836 0.459 * 0.461 0.225 ** 0.461 0.159 *** 0.388 0.350  0.244 0.234  0.046 0.209  
TAX3 -0.301 0.410  -0.957 0.463 ** 0.361 0.226  0.316 0.160 ** 0.140 0.352  0.248 0.236  -0.025 0.208  
FEM 0.158 0.050 *** 0.202 0.090 ** 0.087 0.036 ** 0.178 0.020 *** 0.145 0.045 *** 0.106 0.039 *** 0.089 0.029 *** 
AGE2 0.180 0.152  0.382 0.197 * 0.048 0.093  0.165 0.057 *** 0.230 0.138 * 0.149 0.098  0.078 0.081  
AGE3 0.266 0.148 * 0.391 0.192 ** 0.068 0.092  0.226 0.056 *** 0.328 0.135 ** 0.167 0.095 * 0.070 0.080  
AGE4 0.265 0.151 * 0.493 0.198 ** 0.167 0.096 * 0.344 0.058 *** 0.421 0.138 *** 0.280 0.099 *** 0.183 0.082 ** 
AGE5 0.583 0.178 *** 0.788 0.252 *** 0.439 0.114 *** 0.585 0.070 *** 0.748 0.163 *** 0.618 0.125 *** 0.517 0.098 *** 
Constant 0.637 0.456  1.015 0.496 ** -0.365 0.251  0.126 0.630  -0.239 0.437  -0.587 0.430  0.235 0.247  
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 
Wald test [p-value]                  102 [0.000]                 161 [0.000]                   265 [0.000]                   806 [0.000]                  201 [0.000]                    213 [0.000]                   688 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1, FEM = 0, AGE1 = 1; dummies for birth place included (4 Italian and 9 world 
geographical zones). Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are robust standard errors. 
 
Table B.3. Coefficient estimates from FE LOGIT model – sample of resident individuals  
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.421 0.090 *** -0.782 0.151 *** -0.416 0.080 *** -0.438 0.037 *** -0.364 0.082 *** -0.313 0.078 *** -0.580 0.058 *** 
TAX1 -1.228 0.474 *** -1.127 0.640 * 0.353 0.299  0.032 0.180  -0.207 0.474  -0.604 0.256 ** -0.259 0.369  
TAX2 -0.996 0.471 ** -1.001 0.606 * 0.380 0.296  0.144 0.184  -0.143 0.471  -0.409 0.264  -0.120 0.369  
TAX3 -0.868 0.463 * -1.073 0.634 * 0.372 0.302  0.182 0.187  -0.156 0.481  -0.323 0.271  -0.153 0.364  
Observations 6,317 2,415 15,494 46,268 8,489 12,162 21,022 
Wald test [p-value]                    34 [0.000]                    29 [0.000]                      28 [0.000]                    184 [0.000]                    20 [0.000]                      40 [0.000]                    119 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are 
robust standard errors. 
 Table B.4. Coefficient estimates from FE LOGIT model – sample of resident individuals (male only) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.334 0.118 *** -0.755 0.188 *** -0.403 0.085 *** -0.427 0.044 *** -0.361 0.096 *** -0.330 0.081 *** -0.628 0.064 *** 
TAX1 -1.215 0.685 * -1.355 0.613 ** 0.312 0.352  0.081 0.217  -0.089 0.469  -0.558 0.314 * -0.350 0.306  
TAX2 -0.989 0.680  -1.172 0.611 * 0.353 0.354  0.178 0.208  -0.025 0.468  -0.389 0.306  -0.205 0.297  
TAX3 -0.882 0.668  -1.239 0.627 ** 0.316 0.354  0.220 0.205  -0.028 0.480  -0.299 0.310  -0.219 0.291  
Observations  5,098 2,114 13,368   37,892   7,021 10,242 17,591 
Wald test [p-value]                     24 [0.000]                    21 [0.000]                      35 [0.000]                     121 [0.000]                      16 [0.001]                      39 [0.000]                    108 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are 
robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table B.5. Coefficient estimates from FE LOGIT model – sample of resident individuals (female only) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.710 0.216 *** -0.900 0.353 ** -0.484 0.161 *** -0.476 0.068 *** -0.384 0.182 *** -0.247 0.157  -0.365 0.107 *** 
TAX1 -1.361 1.277  0.196 0.301  0.601 0.837  -0.171 0.437  0.015 0.210  -1.023 1.041  0.828 1.114  
TAX2 -1.091 1.270  -0.146 0.363  0.536 0.830  0.009 0.435  0.077 0.185  -0.698 1.035  0.923 1.112  
TAX3 -0.828 1.265  -0.125 0.921  0.733 0.833  0.029 0.436  0.124 0.453  -0.627 1.033  0.765 1.110  
Observations 1,219   301 2,126  8,376 1,468   1,920   3,431 
Wald test [p-value]                    14 [0.007]                    8 [0.095]                    11 [0.029]                    42 [0.000]                      8 [0.088]                      10 [0.050]                      13 [0.011] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are 
robust standard errors. 
 Table B.6. Coefficient estimates from POOLED LOGIT model – sample of non-resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.004 0.111  0.135 0.182  -0.489 0.401  -0.100 0.150  -0.229 0.125  0.118 0.099  -0.040 0.053  
TAX1 0.194 1.271  1.022 1.168  -0.101 0.722  -0.135 0.306  -0.213 0.489  -0.168 0.486  -0.360 0.251  
TAX2 0.346 1.270  1.148 1.166  -0.188 0.721  -0.245 0.305  -0.208 0.487  0.001 0.484  -0.342 0.250  
TAX3 0.295 1.272  1.149 1.168  -0.148 0.722  -0.381 0.306  -0.139 0.491  0.056 0.486  -0.408 0.252  
FEM -0.178 0.067 *** 0.059 0.109  0.097 0.064  0.047 0.034  -0.090 0.075  -0.001 0.061  0.005 0.040  
AGE2 0.151 0.248  -0.107 0.271  -0.181 0.175  -0.082 0.098  -0.162 0.233  0.270 0.158 * 0.303 0.103 *** 
AGE3 0.029 0.243  -0.043 0.263  -0.310 0.173 * -0.133 0.096  -0.389 0.229 * 0.211 0.155  0.245 0.101 ** 
AGE4 -0.270 0.246  -0.305 0.273  -0.456 0.178 ** -0.240 0.098 ** -0.737 0.233 *** -0.114 0.160  0.125 0.104  
AGE5 -0.232 0.270  -0.329 0.354  -0.681 0.204 *** -0.255 0.113 ** -1.046 0.268 *** -0.274 0.192  0.022 0.125  
Constant -0.860 1.292  -1.650 1.202  -0.517 0.742  0.033 0.325  0.192 0.545  -0.590 0.514  -0.485 0.271 * 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 
Wald test [p-value]                  103 [0.000]                 105 [0.000]                    343 [0.000]                   322 [0.000]                  243 [0.000]                    320 [0.000]                    460 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1, FEM = 0, AGE1 = 1; dummies for birth place included (4 Italian and 9 world 
geographical zones). Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are robust standard errors. 
Table B.7. Coefficient estimates from FE LOGIT model – sample of non-resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.432 0.384  -0.192 0.318  -1.218 1.201  -0.545 0.687  -0.914 0.829  -0.534 0.583  -0.288 0.388  
TAX1 0.050 0.113  -0.447 1.506  -0.642 1.231  -0.285 0.476  -0.022 0.736  -0.524 0.747  -0.576 0.356  
TAX2 -0.170 0.159  0.027 1.494  -0.703 1.227  -0.239 0.473  -0.094 0.729  -0.386 0.746  -0.504 0.352  
TAX3 -0.120 0.420  -1.073 0.600  -0.688 1.225  -0.369 0.475  -0.174 0.734  -0.391 0.748  -0.570 0.353  
Observations 2,393    920 2,944 10,778 1,992 3,009 8,579 
Wald test [p-value]                      5 [0.249]                      6 [0.197]                      7 [0.121]                        6 [0.204]                      3 [0.535]                      5 [0.316]                      6 [0.178] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are 
robust standard errors. 
Fig. 1 The decision tree of a typical taxpayer
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